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Abstract 
An under-exploited role for psychology in trademark law is the testing of explicit or 
implicit judicial assumptions about consumer behaviour.  In this paper we examine an 
assumption that is common across Commonwealth countries, namely, that similar packaging 
is unlikely to cause consumer confusion provided the brand names are dissimilar.  We began 
by selecting branded products commonly found in supermarkets.  For each existing brand we 
created two novel (fictitious) brands with highly similar packaging to the existing brand.  One 
RI WKHVH µlookalike¶ products had a similar name, the other a dissimilar name.  Across two 
yes/no and one forced-choice experiments using photographs of the real and fictitious 
products we looked at false recognition rates.  Contrary to the judicial assumption 
participants largely ignored the brand names when making their decisions based on memory. 
It was only when the pictures of the products were  placed side-by-side (in the forced-choice 
task) that they paid the brand name any significant attention.   
 
Keywords: recognition memory, false memory, trademark law, marketing, advertising 
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HOW IMPORTANT IS THE NAME IN DETERMINING THE PROBABILITY OF 
FALSELY RECOGNISING A LOOKALIKE BRAND? 
At its core trademark law is a law against consumer confusion. This remains the case 
despite the move in many jurisdictions to bring additional forms of harm (so-called trademark 
µGLOXWLRQ¶ZLWKLQWKHVFRSHRIWUDGHPDUNSURWHFWLRQPsychology can provide insights relevant 
to determining what kinds of trader behaviour are most likely to cause confusion. But finding 
the best way to make use of those insights in legal decision-making is not straightforward. If 
SDUWLHVRIIHUHYLGHQFHRIDFWXDOFRQVXPHUV¶UHVSRQVHVWRDPDUNLWRIWHQFRPHVLQWKHIRUPRI
expensive population sample surveys that aim to be representative of the relevant consumer 
population or more rarely in the form of experiments. Yet such evidence is frequently 
rejected or discounted, especially outside the United States (Dinwoodie & Gangjee, 2015; 
Weatherall, 2017). The reasons this evidence is afforded little (if any) weight are 
FRPSOLFDWHG7KHUHDUHWHQVLRQVIRUH[DPSOHEHWZHHQFRXUWV¶GHVLUHIRUHYLGHQFHWKDWFORVHO\
reflects real world situations in which consumers would encounter a mark, and the need to 
keep costs down. Judges may also hesitate to admit scientific evidence that might constrain 
their decision-making. Preserving room for judgment is important because a judge may need 
to resolve conflicting goals: for example, trademark law may need to tolerate some consumer 
confusion in order to avoid restricting competition, by preventing brand owners monopolising 
common terms needed to describe products (Dinwoodie & Gangjee, 2015). If psychological 
research is to have a greater impact on trademark law, we need to identify a role for 
SV\FKRORJLVWV¶ GLVFLSOLQDU\ expertise that recognises and responds to these legitimate 
concerns of the judiciary. 
At present (too) much of the focus on the role of psychological evidence in trademark 
law has been on the value of evidence in particular cases. But psychology can also be useful 
at a higher level of abstraction. Specifically, we can use experimental and survey methods to 
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test the assumptions trademark law makes about how consumers process information. For 
example, we have used subjective responses (a survey method) to test the judicial assumption 
that the beginning of a word is more important than the ending in determining similarity 
(Burt, McFarlane, Kelly, Humphreys, Weatherall, & Burrell, in press). The important point 
here is that we can use the results of a survey that does not attempt to obtain a broadly 
representative sample or an experiment that does not use a high fidelity simulation of a 
shopping scenario to test whether an assumption generally holds without purporting to 
answer whether consumers would or would not be likely to be confused in any given case.  
This paper tests assumptions made by the law about the relative importance that 
FRQVXPHUV DVVLJQ WR EUDQG QDPHV DV FRPSDUHG WR VLPLODULW\ RI SURGXFW DSSHDUDQFH RU µJHW
XS¶ 2XU PRWLYDWLRQ IRU FKRRVLQJ WKLV DV RXU IRFXV ZDV WKH RIWHQ LPSOLFLW DVVXPSWLRQ LQ
many Commonwealth countries that consumers pay more attention to brand names when 
making their purchasing decisions than they do to product appearance. This assumption has 
meant that trademark owners have generally struggled in jurisdictions like Australia and the 
UK to prevent the VDOHRIµORRNDOLNH¶SURGXFWV± as long as the brand names are different, the 
assumption is that consumers will not be confused. The leading Australian case on point is 
the decision of the High Court of Australia in Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v 
Puxu Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 191. See also Dr Martens Australia Pty Ltd v Rivers 
(Australia) Pty Ltd (1999) 95 FCR 136 and Zetco Pty Ltd v Austworld Commodities Pty Ltd 
(No 2) [2011] FCA 848. For recent confirmation that the law in the UK is to the same effect 
see, e.g., George East Housewares Ltd v Fackelmann Gmbh & Co KG Schweppes Ltd v 
Gibbens [2016] EWHC 2476 and The London Taxi Corporation Ltd v Frazer-Nash Research 
Ltd [2016] FSR 20. In fact the law on this point has not moved on very far in either 
jurisdiction since the decision in Schweppes Ltd v Gibbens (1903) 22 RPC 601. In that case 
/RUG+DOVEXU\PHPRUDEO\FRPPHQWHG³if a person is so careless that he does not look, and 
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GRHV QRW«'treat the label fairly,' but takes the bottle without sufficient consideration and 
without reading what is written very plainly indeed upon the face of the label on which the 
trader has placed his own name, then you certainly cannot say he is deceived´. 
This assumption is contrary to much of the marketing research on consumer 
perceptions of brand similarity. While brand name confusion is important in many shopping 
circumstances, particularly in internet search or shopping list reliance, extant marketing 
research has emphasised the importance of perceptual attributes in distinguishing products. In 
particular, the marketing literature has examined the rise of copycat products ± products 
which imitate visual packaging attributes such as colour, shape and lettering while (in 
general) adopting different product names. That literature tests what kinds of visual cues 
consumers use to distinguish unknown products, and considers how consumers interpret or 
respond to the use of similar packaging (Loken & Ward, 1990). There are, for example, 
studies that look at the impact of imitation on consumer willingness to pay: for example, 
Steenkamp, Van Heerde, and Geyskens (2010) show that perceptions of qualitative 
differences between national brands and private labels, and willingness to pay more for 
national brands, are strongly influenced by packaging design. Other studies demonstrate that 
consumers have a preference for products that imitate a brand leader (e.g. Warlop & Alba 
(2004); Aribarg, Arora, Henderson & Kim (2014)). Similarly, Gao, Lim and Tang (2016) use 
visual stimuli to demonstrate that high resemblance but low quality copycat brands can 
successfully gain entry to the market.  
Another strand of the marketing literature focuses on identifying the kinds of 
imitation that lead consumers to see packaging as similar, or have more difficulty 
differentiating the imitating product. Miceli and Pieters (2009) propose and test visual 
imitation (i.e., attribute- based such as colour, shape and name) and thematic- based copycat 
(e.g., higher order imiatation such as country of origin, benefits or values) similarity 
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dimensions, again demonstrating the importance of all packaging elements in brand 
similarity.  Satomura, Wedel and Pieters (2014) developed a method and metric to assess the 
visual similarity or features that make it more difficult to consumers to differentiate between 
leading and copycat brands when they are presented side-by-side. These results are consistent 
with the notion that during brief exposures, consumers accurately identify brand images on 
the basis of mostly coarse visual information (Pieters & Wedel, 2012).  
We extend the marketing literature in two ways. First, by looking at memory 
confusion errors for highly similar packaging but with two different levels of name similarity, 
we examine the combined effects of packaging and brand name in similarity perceptions, 
rather than assuming that one is more important than the other. To preview our results, our 
experimental findings suggest that there is little evidence that dissimilar names prevent 
memory confusion errors in the context of similar packaging. Memory effects are important 
in trademark law, which posits, in disputes, a consumer who is seeking a product or 
trademark they have seen before.  
Second, we are most interested in how work in psychology interrelates with the kinds 
of issues that courts grapple with in trademark disputes. Most of the marketing literature 
concerns itself with exploring consumer responses that fall outside or are only tangentially 
related to tradePDUN ODZ¶V FRUH FRQFHUQ ZLWK SUHYHQWLQJ FRQVXPHU FRQIXVLRQ. The core 
interests of the marketing literature lie in exploring the full nature and scope of consumer 
responses. In this paper, in contrast, our starting point is an assumption of fact made by 
courts.  
As will become evident, our findings do not support the legal assumption that 
motivated our enquiry. This suggests that the assumption needs to be rethought. But this does 
not mean that legal outcomes need necessarily to be different. There may be some alternative 
policy basis for allowing the sale of lookalikes: i.e., a good reason to prevent trademark 
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owners from being given a monopoly over product appearance. For example, there may be a 
legitimate concern about the gradual crowding out of new market entrants as existing market 
actors monopolise common colours, shapes that are easy to manufacture and the like (cf. in 
the United States Valu Engineering, Inc. v. Rexnord Corporation, 278 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) FRQILUPLQJ WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI µFRPSHWLWLYH QHHG¶ ZKHQ GHWHUPLQLQJ ZKHWKHU D
WUDGHPDUN LV µIXQFWLRQDO¶ and hence unable to be monopolised via trademark law). These 
concerns may be sufficiently serious, and the difficulties associated with drawing a line 
EHWZHHQWKHOHJLWLPDWHXVHRIFRPPRQVKDSHVDQGFRORXUVDQGµORRNDOLNH¶SURGXFWVPD\EHVR
pronounced, that the optimal position might be to refuse to extend trademark rights to product 
appearance: either at all or save in cases where there is some special factor at play. The best 
outcome, therefore, may or may not be for the law to retain its present approach. However, at 
the very least, the terms of the debate as to whether the law should intervene to prevent the 
sale of lookalikes need to be recast, as mentioned in the conclusion. 
 
An introduction to the legal issues and the potential role for psychology 
The law that deals with ownership and disputes over elements of branding varies 
significantly from country to country, but there is enough commonality, enforced by 
international treaty obligations, to make some general points. All countries that are members 
of the World Trade Organization (ie, most countries) must enable brand owners to register 
trademarks under article 15 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
3URSHUW\ 5LJKWV RU µ75,36¶. Trademarks are signs and symbols (such as brand names, 
logos, colours or forms of packaging) used to indicate the source of goods or services, and 
can be registered provided consumers will immediately recognise the symbol as indicating 
that goods or services come from a particular company, or have been educated to see the 
symbol as a brand indicator (article 15.1). Registered trademarks are the property of the 
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trademark owner, who has the exclusive right to use the trademark as an indicator of source, 
and who can sue to prevent other producers of similar goods or services using the trademark 
or a mark so similar it is likely to lead to confusion (in the sense of causing consumers to 
think that the alleged infringing goods come from the same trade source) (TRIPS article 16). 
In many countries, including the United States and European Union, owners of trademarks 
also now have broader rights to prevent dilution ± that is, the use of similar marks in a way 
that either tarnishes the brand or in a way that reduces WKH WUDGHPDUN¶V uniqueness or 
distinctiveness (Martino 1996). Registered marks only provide rights in the country where a 
trademark has been registered,1 although there is nothing to stop companies registering their 
marks wherever they have the business to warrant it.  
Most countries also provide legal protection for unregistered aspects of branding 
through general consumer protection laws aimed at preventing misleading commercial 
behaviour, and/or specialised legal protection against the use of unregistered marks such as 
passing off, false advertising and similar legal doctrines (Harms 2012). Thus well-known 
global brands are protected even in countries where they do not register, as are local firms 
known to consumers who have not chosen to register their marks. Liability under these legal 
doctrines tends to depend on the first user of some product nameORJRRUDVSHFWRIµJHWup¶ 
showing (a) that the name, logo or aspect of µJHWup¶ has become associated with (distinctive 
of) the first user; and (b) that its use by an alleged infringer will mislead or confuse 
consumers with respect to the source of the brand or the existence of a commercial 
connection between the companies (Harms 2012).  
Thus in a majority of countries there are several causes of action aimed at protecting 
aspects of branding, in which liability turns on proof of (likely) consumer confusion. In the 
case of unregistered trademarks, the whole gist of the legal action is to give the first user the 
                                                 
1
 Although some regions, such as the European Union, have regional registrations (hence the 
European Union Trade Mark). 
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ability to stop conduct in the marketplace by second comers that leads to consumer 
confusion. In the case of registered trademark law, the role of consumer confusion is more 
complicated in most countries (the United States being something of an exception in this 
regard). Trademark owners have exclusive rights, so proving consumer confusion is generally 
unnecessary if a second comer adopts branding identical to a registered mark on the goods or 
services for which the owner has registered the mark (TRIPS article 16.1). But if the second 
FRPHU¶VPDUNLQJLVnot identical, then a trademark owner will need to prove it is confusingly 
similar.2 Potential consumer confusion is also relevant at the registration stage: trademark 
offices will refuse registration of a trademark that is confusingly similar to one that is already 
registered for similar goods or services. In some cases, the assessment of confusion is very 
abstract: since trademarks can be registered before they are used, courts and trademark 
offices are sometimes not really assessing whether consumers are currently likely to be 
FRQIXVHGE\WKHVHFRQGFRPHU¶VXVHEXWZKHWKHUWKH\would be confused if they knew and 
had an imperfect memory of the registered mark (Burrell and Handler 2016, 222-229; 
Dinwoodie and Gangjee 2015; Weatherall, 2017).  
Courts have to determine the likelihood of consumer confusion, and do so on the basis 
of a range of different types of evidence, although it should be noted that approaches vary 
between jurisdictions. A judge may receive evidence from marketing experts, and they may 
use evidence of facts that are thought to indirectly prove that confusion is more or less likely 
(Beebe, 2006). Courts may also take into account the IDPH RI WKH ILUVW XVHU¶V PDUN WKH
sophistication of the likely consumers, how common elements of the mark are in the 
particular product category (i.e., whether the words, packaging, colours or images are widely 
used in relation to the goods or services in question), whether or not the defendant 
                                                 
2
 7KH WHUPLQRORJ\ KHUH YDULHV IURP MXULVGLFWLRQ WR MXULVGLFWLRQ µFRQIXVLQJO\ VLPLODU¶ LV WKH
American terminology; the European Union asks whether similarity would cause a 
µOLNHOLKRRGRIFRQIXVLRQ¶LQ$XVWUDOLDFRXUWVWDONDERXWµGHFHSWLYHVLPLODULW\¶ 
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deliberately set out to confuse consumers, and any evidence that real world consumers have 
been confused. In addition, courts make assumptions about what sorts of similarity are most 
likely to be confusing: for example, assumptions about the relative importance of the 
beginnings, endings, or vowel sounds of words (Burt et al., in press); the relative importance 
of brand names YHUVXVRWKHUDVSHFWVRISDFNDJLQJRUHOHPHQWVRIDSURGXFW¶V µJHWXS¶ WKDW
consumers will remember.  
Whether these assumptions are accurate is an empirical question, but is often not 
treated that way by the courts. In theory, the central place of confusion in trademark law 
creates an opening for psychology. In the US, consumer surveys have become an accepted 
way to prove consumer confusion (Cohen, 1991), and psychologists have often been involved 
in the design of the large-scale representative surveys submitted to courts. In the UK and 
Australia, however, courts are sceptical about the benefits of empirical evidence designed to 
test likely consumer confusion (Weatherall, 2017). Courts in these jurisdictions require 
parties to prove the value of any surveys or experiments before they are done. Only studies 
that meet a high standard of validity and reliability will be admitted, which necessitates an 
expensive process of ensuring a representative sample,3 and careful question design. In the 
case of ordinary consumer goods, courts frequently either refuse to admit empirical evidence 
(on the basis that it is unnecessary) or allow it in but disregard or discount the results. Often, 
a single judge will end up weighing up all the various facts and making their own judgment 
DVWRZKHWKHUWKH\WKLQNFRQIXVLRQLVVXIILFLHQWO\OLNHO\WRZDUUDQWWKHFRXUW¶VLQWHUYHQWLRQ± 
often making empirical assumptions in the process (Weatherall, 2017). 
We do not take the view that psychology should displace legal judgment. Deciding 
whether a defendant has crossed the line between permissible and impermissible similarity 
                                                 
3
 7KHUHLVDJUHDWHUUHOLDQFHRQVHOHFWLQJVDPSOHVZLWK³UHOHYDQW´GHPRJUDSKLFFKDUDFWHULVWLFV
than from randomly sampling from a defined population.  This is especially true when online 
samples are used.   
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must be made in a broader context that takes into account not merely competition concerns, 
but also issues of what might be called legal policy ± how the parties have conducted 
themselves during the litigation, whether a case has been properly pleaded and so forth. 
Finding the proper role for psychology is therefore far from straightforward. We would, 
KRZHYHU VXJJHVW WKDW HPSLULFDO UHVXOWV FDQ DW OHDVW HQVXUH WKDW MXGJHV¶ UHDVRQLQJ
(assumptions) regarding how consumers think and act are based on reality. Questions of 
memory, in particular, are important in the legal analysis of confusion. The process of 
assessing likely confusion involves considering the response of a consumer who has an 
µimperfect UHFROOHFWLRQ¶ RIWKHFODLPDQW¶VWUDGHPDUNRUSURGXFWSDFNDJLQJDQGWKHQVHHV (e.g., 
on a supermarket shelf or grocery website), or hears (e.g., a radio advertisement or shopping 
instructions from a partner) WKHGHIHQGDQW¶Vbrand. One step towards convincing judges of the 
value of psychological methods generally is to undertake studies that are designed to test 
common judicial assumptions about consumer responses.  
The present work seeks to test one of the assumptions that courts make either 
explicitly or implicitly in cases involving lookalike products in Commonwealth countries. 
Namely, that confusion is unlikely as long as the brand or product name is different (Burrell 
& Handler, 2016). In the Australian Maltesers decision, for example, an imitator adopted 
packaging very similar to the leading chocolate brand, using the same bright red colour on 
packaging that depicted spherical chocolate balls, some of them sliced in half to show a 
\HOORZLVK FHQWUH 7KH FRPSHWLWRU¶V SURGXFW KRZHYHU ZDV FDOOHG µ0DOW %DOOV¶ ,W ZDV KHOG
that given the difference in name, and the likely perfect memory consumers would have for 
the famous brand, consumer confusion was unlikely (Mars Australia Pty Ltd v Sweet 
Rewards Pty Ltd (2009) 81 IPR 354). 
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Psychological Issues 
The assumption that shoppers will not be confused by similar packaging if the brand 
name is different is an assumption about how people recognize stimuli in context. Deciding 
on the validity of the assumption is complex, given that brand name similarity and packaging 
similarity are multivariate concepts. Furthermore, understanding what shoppers attend to 
turns on questions about how existing and novel names are processed, the type of comparison 
process allowed by the shopping scenario (simultaneous or successive comparisons) and what 
the customer is looking to purchase.4  
In order to produce meaningful results, we therefore sought to simplify the factors at 
play. In our experiments the novel (imitator) brands were all fictitious so that we could 
control for prior knowledge. We selected well-known supermarket brands and then created 
two sets of fictitious brand names. Most of the fictitious names in the first set were designed 
to be similar in orthography to a well-known brand, i.e. they shared multiple letters in 
common (Edgell/Vegell). A small proportion of the first set were selected for similarity of 
PHDQLQJ*UHHQ¶V(PHUDOG¶VThe second set of names were dissimilar in both orthography 
and meaning (Duracell/Supaunit). A complete list of names is provided in Appendix A. 
,QHYLWDEO\ WKHUH LV VFRSH WR FKDOOHQJH RXU DVVHVVPHQWV RI µVLPLODULW\¶ VLQFH WKHUH ZDV DQ
unavoidable degree of subjectivity in determining that two words were similar, and no doubt 
our word pairings reflect different degrees of similarity (some are almost identical, others are 
similar but nowhere near identical). Nevertheless, the examples we have chosen are ones 
where we think there is a good argument that, put to the test, most if not all of the marks 
would be considered confusingly similar. 
                                                 
4
 For additional information about the relevance of the work in psychology on recognition in 
context to trademark law see (Humphreys, McFarlane, Burt, Kelly, Weatherall, & Burrell, 
2016). 
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We used high quality full color screenshots of the packaging (e.g., a can of beans, a 
breakfast cereal box, etc.). With the similar names the same high quality image of the known 
brand was used. With the dissimilar names a minor change in the image was made in that we 
also manipulated the the color and/or font of the name.5  This produces a strong match 
between the contents of memory for the picture and the distractor picture tested, but is 
unlikely to have any further impact on the results from the yes/no task used in Experiments 
1A and 1B. That is, it would have been possible to produce an equally strong match by 
shortening the retention interval or presenting the studied image for a longer period of time. 
These manipulations of match strength are possible because it is established that in general 
people do not have detailed memories for the features of highly familiar objects. For 
example, there is a considerable amount of evidence showing that Americans do not have a 
detailed memory for whether the head faces left or right on the Lincoln penny (Kosslyn & 
Rabin, 1999; Nickerson & Adams, 1979). Of course, the similarity of the pictures is obvious 
in a forced choice test where a picture of the existing brand is paired with the same or highly 
similar picture of the novel brand.  This change in the saliency of using the same or a highly 
similar picture for the novel brand in going from a yes/no to a forced-choice test provided 
much of the motivation for using a forced-choice test in Experiment 2. 
Across experiments we looked at simultaneous versus successive judgments to reflect 
different shopping scenarios. The more common scenario is that the shopper has set out to 
purchase an existing brand that they have purchased before. In store, they may then encounter 
a brand with highly similar packaging but with a novel name which may be either similar or 
dissimilar to the name of the brand that they intend to purchase. The second scenario is that 
the shopper has decided  to purchase a brand for the first time (e.g., a new type of shampoo) 
                                                 
5
 These images were created for a slightly different purpose but the difference in the 
similarity of the images was retained in this study.  However, this confound does not change 
our conclusions because it can only enhance the apparent effect of name similarity not reduce 
it. 
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and has been told the name of the product and shown the bottle (e.g. by a friend or in an 
advertisement).  Once in store, they encounter a product in packaging that is similar to the 
brand they are hoping to try. Again, the name XVHGRQWKHµORRNDOLNH¶SURGXFWmay be similar 
or dissimilar to the name of the brand which they encounter in the store. Our goal in this 
research was to identify the main variables that would impact on brand choice in these 
scenarios. The legal assumption is that in situations where the rest of the context (the 
packaging) is very similar, a dissimilar name will generally be sufficient to avoid consumer 
confusion.  
We must account, however, for other psychological processes that may complicate the 
effects of item similarity.  In particular, there may be a tendency to choose the existing name 
and avoid the novel name. Such a tendency has been reported in the marketing literature 
(Hoyer & Brown, 1990; Park & Lennon, 2009). The cognitive literature shows that words 
that occur commonly in text (high frequency words) are more easily identified than lower 
frequency words (Monsell, 1991). But when shoppers are performing a recognition memory 
judgment ± that is, deciding whether a brand is the same as one that they encountered 
previously in a specific context (e.g., in a shopping list, or in the study phase of the 
experiment) ± the effects can be complex. Memory research with words shows that episodic 
recognition of words from a prior study list is inferior for high frequency compared to low 
frequency words (Glanzer & Bowles, 1976). The latter are less likely to be encountered in 
everyday life just prior to the experiment, so that confusion among the different encounters 
with a word is reduced. However, this effect reverses with very low frequency words, which 
suffer a disadvantage in recognition  (Chalmers & Humphreys, 1998; Osth & Dennis, 2014). 
In our test (reflecting a common phenomenon in consumer marketing), our novel brands are 
made up although they sometimes contain one or more known words. Due to these 
16 
 
complications, no clear prediction for the level of recognition of existing brands versus our 
invented brands is possible.  
Our research design sought to test the effects of item similarity while accounting for 
the impact of brand familiarity using a complex within subject (within list) design, in which 
we used pictures of existing brands with a visible brand name, and highly similar (or same) 
pictures with novel brand names. The novel names were either similar or dissimilar to an 
existing brand in the experiment. After studying a subset of brands containing both existing 
and novel brands, the participant made a recognition decision on three different types of 
items defined by their relationship to a studied item. There were studied items (targets), 
related distractors, and unrelated distractors. Related distractors were highly similar or 
identical product pictures to studied items (not included at test), but had different brand 
names from the studied items: if the studied item had an existing brand name, the 
corresponding related distractor had a novel brand name (either similar or dissimilar); if the 
studied item had a novel brand name, the corresponding related distractor had an existing 
brand name. Unrelated distractors were novel and existing brands whose product categories 
had not been included in the study list. Across different study lists, each item on the test list 
served equally often as a target, a related distractor, and an unrelated distractor.   
One possible criticism of this experimental design is that it is highly artificial, and that 
the task we are asking of our subjects is too far divorced from the task that faces consumers 
in real world shopping scenarios. In particular, we asked the same subject to study both real, 
known products (with an existing brand name and packaging), and manipulated products 
(with essentially the same packaging as an existing but unstudied brand, but an unknown 
brand name) and tested the same subject on both existing and novel brands. This might seem 
too different from a consumer who has a (real) memory for an existing product and is 
searching only for that product when she is confronted at the store with similar-looking 
17 
 
products. However, the kind of confusion we are testing for would be encountered in the real 
world and would be a concern for trademark law. A consumer could be seeking a product 
based on only a fleeting encounter with the packaging ± via advertising, or being shown an 
unfamiliar product by a friend or family member. He or she might also be searching for a 
variety of products, some of which he or she knows from previous shopping experiences and 
others of which were previously unfamiliar to him or her. Our design tests whether very 
different names will, in such scenarios, lead to substantially less error.   
A complex design of this kind is not common in marketing research, but has several 
advantages for our purposes. The use of multiple instances of each type of item not only 
increases the power of the design, but also enhances generality. It also captures the fact that 
recognition decisions are made against a background of memories for the other items in the 
list or episode, as well as memories from previous encounters with that stimulus or other 
stimuli (Dennis & Humphreys, 2001; Humphreys, Bain, & Pike, 1989; Osth & Dennis, 
2014). This design enables us to assess whether there is a tendency to choose existing brands 
over novel brands by comparing the false alarm rate (FAR) for unrelated distractors that are 
existing brands versus novel brands.  It also gives us information as to whether existing 
brands are better learned than novel brands by comparing the hit rate (HR) for targets that are 
existing brands versus novel brands. Finally, and most importantly for present purposes, it 
can tell us how much people are confused by the related distractors through comparing the 
FARs to related and unrelated distractors. This is done separately for distractors that are 
existing brands versus those that are novel brands. In other words, we can investigate the 
complex interactions between brand familiarity, product category, packaging and brand name 
similarity by looking at different FARs in different relations. 
In order to further tease out these interactions in a range of shopping contexts we have 
used both a yes/no task and a forced-choice task. While forced-choice tasks have been 
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favoured in marketing research, both types of scenarios occur in shopping contexts. Where 
original and imitator brands are presented on the shelf side-by-VLGH D FRQVXPHU¶VGHFLVLRQ
mirrors a forced-choice task. There are, however, shopping scenarios involving presentation 
of only one product on the shelf, which elicit a yes/no decision process: for example, where a 
product has temporarily sold out, the products have been placed at a physical distance from 
one another, or simply because the store only stocks one product. This last scenario is of 
particular importance in the case of supermarkets that rely heavily on imitation strategies and 
where only imitator brands may be available in some product categories. Equally importantly, 
it is the scenario that is most often posited by trademark law, where we tend to be concerned 
primarily about the danger that a consumer may be confused when encountering the 
GHIHQGDQW¶VSURGXFWLQLVRODWLRQDVZLWQHVVHGE\WKHODZ¶VFRQFHUQIRUWKHSRVVLEOHLPSDFWRI
IDXOW\PHPRU\RUµLPSHUIHFWUHFROOHFWLRQ¶ 
In our yes/no task (Experiments 1A and 1B), participants were asked to remember 
shopping items representing novel and existing brands that were presented, one at a time, 
pictorially in their packaging.  They were tested in an old/new recognition test on items they 
had studied, unrelated unstudied items from unseen product categories, and related distractors 
that were similar in name and packaging to studied items (Experiment 1A) or dissimilar in 
name but similar in packaging to studied items (Experiment 1B).  In each experiment there 
were two groups which differed in the sampling of the distractors for the test. For the existing 
brand FAR group, the related distractors were existing brands, whereas for the novel brand 
FAR group, the related distractors were novel brands.  
The design of Experiments 1A and 1B allowed us to answer three questions: 
1. The first was our core research question: whether the use of a dissimilar brand 
name would prevent confusion between the studied brand and the distractor 
brand with highly similar packaging. If the legal assumption holds true, we 
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would expect a large difference between the FAR for related distractors in 
Experiments 1A and 1B (that is, the related FAR would be much higher in 
Experiment 1A (with similar names) than 1B (with dissimilar names)). We 
would also expect that the FAR to related distractors in Experiment 1A 
(similar names) would be substantially greater than the FAR for unrelated 
distractors, whereas the difference would be small in Experiment 1B 
(dissimilar names). 
2. The second was the impact of other factors: in particular, whether there would 
be a tendency to choose an existing brand over a novel brand.  If this were 
true, we would have expected our participants to make more false alarms 
when the unrelated distractor was an existing brand than when it was a novel 
brand. 
3.  The final question was whether a novel brand (i.e., new entrant to category) 
was more likely to be confused for an existing brand (i.e., established category 
brand) or whether an existing brand was more likely to be confused for a novel 
brand. Most research has examined the impacts on an existing brand of a novel  
imitation brand entering the category, but there are shopping scenarios which 
might produce confusion the other way ± perhaps when there is an absence of 
the novel brand (sell out or supermarket shelf placement strategy), or a person 
inexperienced with the category is relying upon memory to purchase a brand 
HJKXVEDQGVKRSSLQJIRUZLIH¶VVKDPSRR)HZVWXGLHVKDYHH[DPLQHGWKH
potential cross effects of imitation brands and original brands, and whether 
these effects might be asymmetric. Lawyers are most likely to be concerned 
about novel brands being mistaken for existing brands, but if the tendency 
observed in the marketing literature holds true, the opposite form of confusion 
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may be more likely (existing brand mistaken for studied novel brand) (van 
Horen & Pieters, 2012).  Indeed, the long proven marketing strategy of brand 
extension relies on this notion that both the original and novel extension brand 
will benefit  from the extension (Broniarczyk & Alba, 1994; Park, Milberg & 
Lawson, 1991).  
 Adding Experiment 2, a forced-choice task, enables a number of further insights. By 
asking participants to choose between pictures of two products shown side-by-side, we can 
compare simultaneous versus sequential presentation of products to understand whether they 
result in different levels of confusion. Both lawyers and psychologists would expect better 
discriminability when products are presented side-by-side, although we would still expect 
less discriminability where a related distractor with a very similar name is presented, 
compared to situations where the related distractor has a very different name. 
Discriminability should also be better with same category pairs than with products from 
different categories: with highly similar distractors, accuracy is better when the choice is 
between a target and a distractor that is highly similar to that target (Heathcote, Freeman, 
Etherington, Tonkin, & Bora, 2009; Tulving, 1981).6  
 
 
EXPERIMENT 1A 
Method 
Participants 
                                                 
6
 ,Q WKH SV\FKRORJ\ OLWHUDWXUH WKH VWDQGDUG H[SODQDWLRQ IRU VXEMHFWV¶ EHWWHU SHUIRUPDQFH
ZKHUHGLVWUDFWRUVDUHKLJKO\VLPLODULVWKDWWKH³PHPRU\VWUHQJWKV´RIDWDUJHWDQGLWVKLJKO\
similar distractor will be positively correlated, with the result that the difference between the 
two memory strengths will be less variable than when the choice is between a target and a 
distractor whose memory strengths are uncorrelated.  However, in the situation which we will 
be investigating, this explanation may not apply: in a side-by-side presentation we would 
expect participants to focus on the only aspects which differentiate the products ± that is, the 
brand names. 
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Sixty undergraduate students from The University of Queensland participated in 
Experiment 1A in exchange for credit toward a first-year psychology course. Half of the 
students were randomly assigned to the existing brand FAR condition, and half were 
randomly assigned to the novel brand FAR condition. All participants were required to be 
Australian citizens or permanent residents for four or more years. 
Materials 
The 36 well-known brands and the pictures of their packaging came from 36 different 
product categories commonly found in supermarkets.  All images were a consistent size (300 
x 300 pixels), presented in colour on a white background, and brand names (the well-known 
name, the fictitious similar name, or the fictitious dissimilar name) were always clearly 
visible on the packaging. Care was taken to select well-known brands that are only used on a 
relatively limited range of products, and that the novel brands were not in use commercially 
in relation to the tested products. See Appendix A for the complete list of product categories 
with corresponding brand names employed in the experiment.  
Design  
For Experiment 1A, only the existing and similar-name novel brands were used.  The 
composition of the test list was manipulated between-subjects (existing brand FAR vs. novel 
brand FAR). In both conditions, half of the study list comprised 12 existing brand items and 
half comprised 12 novel brand items. In order to create the study lists 24 brand categories 
were randomly chosen for each participant with half of the categories contributing an existing 
brand and half contributing a novel brand. In the existing brand FAR condition, the test list 
consisted of all of the existing brand items that had been studied earlier and half of the 
studied novel brand items. The other half of the novel brand items were replaced with related 
distractors. That is, for example, the unstudied existing brand, Duracell was tested after 
studying Evacell.  In the novel brand FAR condition, the test list consisted of all of the 
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studied novel brand items plus half of the studied existing brand items. The other half of the 
studied existing brand items were replaced with related distractors.  That is, the existing 
brand, Duracell, was studied and Evacell was tested. In addition, there were six existing 
brands and six novel brands from 12 unstudied product categories included in both the 
existing brand and the novel brand FAR conditions.  These were the unrelated distractors.  
Thus in all test lists there were 18 targets and 18 distractors (see Figure 1). 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Procedure 
The experiment was computer administered, and participants were tested individually. 
All participants were given instructions prior to the start of the experiment that they would be 
SUHVHQWHGZLWKD³VKRSSLQJOLVW´RILWHPVZLWKHDFKLWHPSUHVHQWHGRQHDWa time on the 
screen for four seconds each. They were instructed that their task was to memorise the items, 
as their memory would be tested for the items at a later time. Consistent with this, the study 
phase of the experiment consisted of study item images being presented in the center of the 
screen on a white background one at a time for 4000 ms each. Following the study phase, a 
self-paced lexical decision task unrelated to the experiment was presented that participants 
took between 15 and 20 minutes to complete. This task was followed by a self-paced single 
item recognition test. 
Prior to the test phase, participants were instructed that the procedure for the single 
item recognition test would involve the test item images being presented one at a time in the 
center of the screen with buttons labellHGµ<(6¶DQGµ12¶DSSHDULQJGLUHFWO\XQGHUQHDWKHDFK
test item image. If participants believed they had seen the item during the study phase, they 
ZHUH UHTXLUHG WR FOLFNRQ WKHEXWWRQ ODEHOHG µ<(6¶ ,I WKH\EHOLeved they had not seen the 
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LWHP GXULQJ WKH VWXG\ SKDVH WKH\ ZHUH UHTXLUHG WR FOLFN RQ WKH EXWWRQ ODEHOHG µ12¶ No 
information was provided about the nature of the distractors. Once a button was clicked, the 
next test item image would appear. Upon completion of the test phase participants were 
debriefed. 
Results 
 7KHPHDQSUREDELOLW\RIUHVSRQGLQJµ<(6¶(old) for existing and novel brands at test 
is shown in Table 1.   
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 A 2 x 2 mixed-model ANOVA was conducted on HRs with brand type of tested item 
(existing vs. novel) included as the within-subjects factor and test list condition (existing 
brand FAR vs. novel brand FAR) as the between-subjects factor. A main effect of brand type 
was observed, F (1, 58) = 4.49, MSE = .01, p = .038, Șp2 = .07, with lower HRs observed for 
existing brands (M = .88) than novel brands (M = .93). No main effect of test list condition or 
interaction between brand type and test list condition were observed, both Fs < 1. An 
independent-groups t-test conducted on the related brand FARs revealed no significant 
difference between test list conditions, t < 1. In both test list conditions, we subtracted the 
unrelated FAR from the corresponding related FAR for each participant and tested whether 
these difference scores significantly differed from zero. In the novel brand FAR condition, 
this difference score (.64) significantly differed from zero, t(29) = 11.55, p < .001, d = 2.11.7 
                                                 
7
 When we have a concern about the magnitude of an effect (difference) we report Cohen's d 
if we have used a t-test and Cohen's f if we have used an ANOVA (Cohen, 1988). For our 
one-sample t-WHVWV&RKHQ¶Vd is the mean of the difference scores minus the null hypothesis 
mean (i.e., zero for difference scores) divided by the standard deviation. Cohen proposed d 
values of .20, .50, and .80 correspond to small, medium, and large effects in the behavioural 
sciencHV&RKHQ¶Vf is the standard deviation of population means divided by their common 
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This difference (.67) was also significant in the existing brand FAR condition, t(29) = 12.47, 
p < .001, d = 2.27. 
An additional 2 x 2 mixed-model ANOVA was conducted on the unrelated FARs 
with brand type of tested item (existing vs. novel) as the within-subjects factor and test list 
condition (existing brand FAR vs. novel brand FAR) as the between-subjects factor. No main 
effects or interaction between the factors were observed, all Fs < 1. Thus there was no 
indication that there was a bias to choose an existing brand.   
 
Discussion 
The FAR to related distractors was much larger than the FAR to unrelated distractors 
in both the existing brand FAR condition and in the novel brand FAR condition, but we could 
not tell whether this was due to the similarity of the packaging and/or the similarity of the 
brand names. The results of Experiment 1B below, which tested dissimilar names, helps 
answer this question. The HR was slightly higher for novel brand targets than for existing 
brand targets.  We had no prediction about this comparison because non-words and unknown 
words are generally recognized less well than known words, and we expected that the real 
words used in some of the existing brand names would function like known words.  
However, the use of one or more known words in the novel brand names complicates this 
prediction. It did not matter whether participants had studied an existing brand and were 
tested on a highly similar brand, or whether they had studied a novel brand and were tested 
on a highly similar existing brand as the related FARs in these two conditions were almost 
identical. The analysis of the unrelated FARs showed that there was no evidence of a 
tendency to choose an existing brand over a novel brand. 
                                                                                                                                                        
standard deviation; f was calculated using Șp2 for relevant main effects in these analyses. 
Cohen proposed f values of .10, .25, and .40 correspond to small, medium, and large effects 
in the behavioural sciences. 
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EXPERIMENT 1B 
Method 
Participants  
Sixty undergraduate students from The University of Queensland participated in 
Experiment 1B in exchange for credit toward a first-year psychology course. None of the 
participants in Experiment 1A were used. Half of the students were randomly assigned to the 
existing brand FAR condition, and half were randomly assigned to the novel brand FAR 
condition. All participants were required to be Australian citizens or permanent residents for 
four or more years. 
Design, Materials, and Procedure 
The design, materials and procedure of Experiment 1B were the same as Experiment 
1A. The only difference was that novel brands with dissimilar names were used.  
   
Results 
 7KHPHDQSUREDELOLW\RIUHVSRQGLQJµ<(6¶ROGIRUexisting and novel brands at test 
is shown in Table 2. 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
A 2 x 2 mixed-model ANOVA was conducted on HRs with brand type of tested item 
(existing vs. novel) included as the within-subjects factor and test list condition (existing 
brand FAR vs. novel brand FAR) as the between-subjects factor. No main effects of brand 
type, F < 1, test list condition, F(1, 58) = 3.04, p = .087, or interaction between the factors 
were observed, F < 1. An independent-groups t-test conducted on the related FARs for 
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existing and novel brands revealed no significant difference between test list conditions, t(58) 
= 1.64, p = .106. 
We subtracted the unrelated FAR from the corresponding related FAR for each 
participant in both test list conditions and tested whether these difference scores significantly 
differed from zero. In the novel brand FAR condition, this difference score (.56) significantly 
differed from zero, t(29) = 10.44, p < .001, d = 1.90.8  This difference (.59) was also 
significant in the existing brand FAR condition, t(29) = 10.44, p < .001, d = 1.60. In order to 
compare unrelated FARs to existing and novel brands, we subtracted the unrelated FAR to 
novel brands from the unrelated FAR to existing brands in both the novel brand FAR 
condition and the existing brand FAR condition. The difference scores in both the novel 
brand FAR condition (.03) and in the existing brand FAR condition (.08) were significantly 
different from zero, t(29) = 2.69, p = .012, d = .49, and t(29) = 2.39, p = .024, d = .44, 
respectively. 
A 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA conducted on FARs to related distractors with 
experiment (1A and 1B) and test list condition (existing brand FAR vs. novel brand FAR) 
included as factors revealed no significant main effect of experiment, F(1, 116) = 1.85, p = 
.176, main effect of test list condition, F(1, 116) = 1.56, p = .214, or interaction, F(1, 116) = 
1.07, p    (IIHFW VL]HV &RKHQ¶V f) for the main effect of experiment and test list 
FRQGLWLRQZHUH DQGUHVSHFWLYHO\FRUUHVSRQGLQJWRVPDOOHIIHFWVL]HVXQGHU&RKHQ¶V
(1988) guidelines. If the true effect sizes were medium (f = .25) or large (f = .40), post hoc 
power analyses using G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) revealed that 
we would have power of .78 or .99, respectively, to detect significant effects with our current 
sample of 120 participants. 
                                                 
8
 In the novel brand FAR condition, no participant made a false alarm to an unrelated 
distractor when the distractor was a novel brand. This also occurs in the two unrelated FAR 
comparisons.  The logic of testing whether a difference score differs from zero is unaffected. 
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Discussion 
When we subtracted the unrelated FAR from the corresponding related FAR in 
Experiments 1A and 1B and tested to see if the resulting distributions had means greater than 
zero, we obtained highly significant results with large effect sizes for both experiments.  
However, the p values are somewhat lower and the effect sizes are somewhat larger in 
Experiment 1A where the brand names for the related distractors were similar to a studied 
brand name than in Experiment 1B where the brand names are dissimilar. Nevertheless, the 
statistical evidence available does not indicate a sizable reduction in confusion from 
Experiment 1A to 1B.  When we compared the related FARs in Experiment 1A (similar 
names) with the related FARs in Experiment 1B (dissimilar names) the difference was not 
significant.  Post hoc power analyses showed that we had a .78 or .99 probability of finding a 
significant effect (p LIWKHWUXHHIIHFWVL]H&RKHQ¶Vf) was medium (.25) or large (.40). 
Although it is an arbitrary designation, these effect sizes are considered standard guides in the 
psychological literature (Cohen, 1988).  
Additionally, it is noteworthy that when we compared related and unrelated FARs we 
observed highly significant results and very large effect sizes in Experiment 1B where 
dissimilar names were used.  For legal purposes, the (large) absolute size of the related FAR 
with dissimilar names, is also likely to be informative. We defer until after the results from 
Experiment 2 whether we have grounds for concluding that we have found a counterexample 
to the generalization that dissimilar names will protect against confusion. 
In Experiment 1B, significantly more false alarms were made to unrelated distractors 
with an existing brand name than to unrelated distractors with a novel brand name. This is 
consistent with findings from the marketing literature, but is inconsistent with the results 
from Experiment 1A. A possible explanation for this discrepancy is that the novel brands in 
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Experiment 1A were not thought of as novel brands. Instead, the combination of the 
packaging and the similar brand name was perceived to be the existing brand. Unlike 
Experiment 1A, there was no difference in the HRs between existing and novel brand names. 
Our conclusion is that any differences are small and largely uninterpretable due to the 
different kinds of existing and made up names, and the possibility that a bias to choose 
existing brands has inflated the HRs for existing brands. 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
In Experiment 2 we used a forced-choice test.  The primary purpose was to see 
whether yes/no and forced choice tests produced the same results. In addition, we 
manipulated the relationship between the distractor and the target in the test pairs in order to 
learn more about the similar and dissimilar names. Specifically, in some test pairs the study 
item was paired with an unstudied brand from the same product category, whereas in other 
test pairs the study item was paired with an unstudied brand from a different product 
category.  However, the unstudied brand from a different product category was similar to 
another studied brand. When the unstudied brand in a test pair was from the same product 
category as the studied member of the test pair, we expected participants to ignore the 
packaging and focus on the name. This should have improved recognition performance. 
However, we could not predict the likely impact with any degree of certainty because we did 
not know either the magnitude of any tendency to choose the known brand in a pair, or how 
much difficulty would be produced by asking participants to choose between similar names.     
 
Method 
Participants 
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Fifty-eight undergraduate students from The University of Queensland participated in 
Experiment 2 in exchange for credit toward a first-year psychology course. Half of the 
students were randomly assigned to the similar brand condition, and half were randomly 
assigned to the dissimilar brand condition. All participants were required to be Australian 
citizens or permanent residents for four or more years. An additional 31 participants 
distributed evenly across both conditions (17 from the dissimilar brand condition and 14 from 
the similar brand condition) were tested, but their data had to be excluded due to a computer 
fault. Because of the random nature of this exclusion, this does not effect any of our 
conclusions. 
Materials 
The materials were the same as those used in the preceding experiments with the 
exception that all 36 product categories provided study items: 18 categories provided existing 
brand items for study, while the remaining 18 provided either similar or dissimilar novel 
brand name items for study depending on the brand type condition the participant was 
assigned to. The study list therefore consisted of 36 items. 
Design and Procedure 
The brand type composition of both study and test lists was manipulated between-
subjects (similar brand name vs. dissimilar brand name). In the similar brand name condition, 
half of the 36 item study list comprised existing brand names (e.g., Duracell) and half 
comprised similar novel brand names (e.g., Evacell). In the dissimilar brand condition, half of 
the study list comprised existing brand items (e.g., Duracell) and half comprised dissimilar 
novel brand items (e.g., Supaunit). 
At test, 24 test pairs containing one studied item (target) and one unstudied item 
(distractor) were presented in a forced-choice test.  Each test pair consisted of one existing 
and one novel brand.  All of the distractors shared their product category with a target.  In 
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half of the test pairs, the distractor came from the same category as the target (same category 
condition ± e.g., Duracell (target) vs. Evacell (similar) or Supaunit (dissimilar)).  In the other 
half of the test pairs, the distractor came from a studied category other than the target 
category (different category condition ± e.g., Duracell (target) vs. Bright Wings (similar) or 
%DNHU¶V+HOSGLVVLPLODUZKHQboth Duracell and White Wings had been studied; see Figure 
2).  In addition, in half of the pairs the target was an existing brand item and in the other half 
it was a novel brand item.  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
The result was a 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design with the presence of similar and dissimilar 
brand items in the test list manipulated between-subjects, and the composition of the test 
pairs (same category or different category) and the type of target (an existing brand item or a 
novel brand item) manipulated within-subjects.  The results were analysed as two 2 x 2 
ANOVAs: one for test pairs with existing brand items as targets, and one for test pairs with 
novel brand items as targets. 
The procedure was the same as that used in the preceding experiments, except that a 
self-paced forced choice test was employed instead of a single item recognition test. Prior to 
the test phase, participants were instructed that the procedure for the forced choice test would 
involve two test item images being presented together in the center of the screen. Participants 
were required to click on the item they believed they had seen during the study phase. Once 
an image was clicked, the next pair of test images would appear. The assignment of targets to 
the left or right position of the pair was determined randomly for each test pair. 
 
Results 
31 
 
The mean probability of correctly selecting the studied item (target) for existing, 
novel similar, and novel dissimilar brands at test is shown in Table 3. 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
To examine existing brand targets, a 2 x 2 mixed-model ANOVA was conducted on 
probability correct with pair type composition (same category vs. different category) included 
as the within-subjects factor and novel brand condition (similar to existing brand name vs. 
dissimilar to existing brand name) as the between-subjects factor. A main effect of pair type 
was observed, F(1, 56) = 16.51, MSE = .02, p < .001, Șp2 = .23, with lower HRs observed for 
studied existing brands paired with non-studied novel brand items from a different product 
category (M = .81) than for studied existing brands paired with non-studied novel brand items 
from the same product category (M = .91). No main effect of novel brand condition was 
observed, F < 1, and the effect size was very small (f = .04). If the true size of this effect was 
medium (f = .25) or large (f = .40), post hoc power analyses using G*Power 3.1 revealed that 
we would have power of .61 or .95, respectively, to detect significant effects with our sample 
of 58 participants. No interaction between pair type and novel brand condition was observed, 
F < 1. 
To examine novel brand targets, a 2 x 2 mixed-model ANOVA was conducted on 
probability correct with pair type composition (same category vs. different category) included 
as the within-subjects factor and novel brand condition (similar to existing brand name vs. 
dissimilar to existing brand name) as the between-subjects factor. Although no main effect of 
pair type was observed, F(1, 56) = 3.15, p = .082, a significant main effect of novel brand 
condition was observed, F(1, 56) = 4.83, MSE = .04, p = .032, Șp2 = .08, with lower 
probability correct observed for studied novel target brands that were similar to existing 
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brands (M = .75) than for studied novel target brands that were dissimilar to existing brands 
(M = .83). 7KHHIIHFWVL]H&RKHQ¶V f) for this comparison was .29. No interaction between 
pair type and novel brand condition was observed, F < 1. 
Two additional 2 x 2 within-subjects ANOVAs were also conducted on probability 
correct for each similarity condition separately, with pair type composition (same category 
vs. different category) and target type (existing vs. novel) included as factors. In the analysis 
on the similar novel brand condition, although no main effect of pair type was observed, F < 
1, a significant main effect of target type was observed, F(1, 28) = 10.33, MSE = .04, p = 
.003, Șp2 = .27, with lower probability correct observed for studied novel brands (M = .74) 
than for studied existing brands (M = .87). The interaction between pair type and target type 
was also significant, F(1, 28) = 8.66, MSE = .02, p = .006, Șp2 = .24, with simple effects tests 
for pair type revealing that studied existing brands were better recognised when presented in 
same category pairs (M = .92) than different category pairs (M = .81), F(1, 28) = 9.61, p = 
.004, Șp2 = .26, while studied novel brands showed no significant effect of pair type, with a 
trend in the opposite direction favoring different category pairs (M = .77) over same category 
pairs (M = .72), F(1, 28) = 1.19, p = .285. 
Similarly, the analysis on the dissimilar brand condition also obtained a significant 
interaction between pair type and target type, F(1, 28) = 7.61, MSE = .02, p = .010, Șp2 = .21, 
with simple effects tests for pair type revealing that studied existing brands were better 
recognised when presented in same category pairs (M = .90) than different category pairs (M 
= .81), F(1, 28) = 6.92, p = .014, Șp2 = .20, while studied novel brands only showed a trend 
toward being better recognised when presented in different category pairs (M = .86) than 
same category pairs (M = .80), F(1, 28) = 2.26, p = .144. No main effect of pair type or target 
type was observed, both Fs < 1. 
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Discussion 
As expected, when studied existing brands were tested side-by-side with a distractor, 
performance was better with same category pairs than with different category pairs.  There 
was, however, no indication that the similarity between the target and distractor names in the 
pair made a difference. A post hoc power analysis indicated that we had probabilities of .61 
and .95 to detect a significant effect (p < .05) if a medium or large effect size existed. This 
result is consistent with results showing that, by themselves, the effects of orthographic, 
phonological, and semantic similarity on false recognitions are generally small (Criss, 2006; 
Underwood & Humphreys, 1979). This particular result does not support the judicial 
assumption that, even when contextual elements such as packaging are highly similar, 
dissimilar names will prevent confusion.  
When studied novel brands were tested, those novel brands were less well recognized 
when paired with similar compared to dissimilar brands. However, because this only 
happened when the studied brand is novel, the results do not support the judicial assumption 
about lookalike brands not being confused with existing brands if the name is different. In 
addition, it is arguable that the difference in the FARs of .08 with a medium effect size of .29 
is not so large that we would expect that courts or lawyers would consider it important. There 
was also a trend for performance to be better with different category than same category 
pairs. This trend was not significant, but when the results from the similar and dissimilar 
novel brand conditions were analysed separately there was a significant interaction between 
pair type (same category vs. different category) and target type (existing brand vs. novel 
brand) in both conditions.  
We believe that some, or all, of this interaction may be due to the tendency noted in 
the marketing literature to choose the existing brand over the novel brand.  We had observed 
such inclinations in Experiment 1B where participants made more false alarms to unrelated 
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brands when they were existing brands than when they were dissimilar novel brands. This 
phenomenon was not observed in Experiment 1A where the novel brands were similar to 
existing brands. However, with same category forced choice tests it would have been 
apparent that one brand name was an existing brand and the other was a novel brand. In turn, 
this may have caused participants to notice that one of the brands in a different category pair 
is also novel. Although we think that bias processes are almost certainly playing a role, in 
order to explain the observed pattern of results the bias would have to differ as a function of 
pair type (same vs. different category), target type (existing vs. novel brand), and novel brand 
condition (similar vs. dissimilar). The complexity of our findings illustrates the problem with 
forced-choice tests in that there are too many unmeasured factors influencing performance.  
 
General Discussion: what do these results tell us about trademark law and its assumptions? 
Although the present work addresses only some facets of brand recognition by 
consumers, it is possible to draw some conclusions that have potentially important 
implications.  
First, our results suggest that the use of a similar brand name together with similar 
packaging will cause people to mistakenly identify a novel brand as an existing brand. This is 
hardly surprising as a matter of common sense or from the perspective of existing legal 
doctrine, but it is worth noting that, in this respect at least, trademark law appears to rest on a 
firm foundation.  
Secondly, yes/no and forced-choice recognition tasks seem to produce different 
results. Providing participants with an opportunity to compare brands side-by-side does cause 
them to examine names more closely, at least when the packaging is very similar.9 This too is 
                                                 
9
 Notably this is underlined by the fact that with the forced choice tasks, there was a 
difference between same category and different category pairs. This presumably occurs 
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consistent with trademark law, which in general concerns itself more with sequential 
presentation of brands. Insofar as the law is concerned with simultaneous presentation, the 
assumption tends to be that confusion is less likely to arise.  Again, this result is not 
surprising,  but is nevertheless still worth noting ± there is value in identifying areas where 
WKHODZ¶Vassumptions are borne out, not merely where they are misplaced.  
 :KHUHRXU H[SHULPHQWDO ILQGLQJVGHSDUW IURP WKH ODZ¶V DVVXPSWLRQV DQGKHQFHDUH
more controversial, is in our observation that when a consumer commits a product to 
PHPRU\ KLV RU KHU UHFROOHFWLRQ LV OLNHO\ WR IRFXV LQ VLJQLILFDQW SDUW RQ WKH µJHW XS¶ RI WKH
product. Consequently, a dissimilar name will not necessarily protect against false brand 
recognition.  
Here it is important to bear in mind a qualification as to what our study seeks to show. 
It will be remembered that our methodology in Experiments 1A, 1B, and 2 turned on 
participants being asked whether they had been shown an item during the experiment. This is 
a reasonable proxy for the type of scenario that attracts much legal attention; namely, the 
reaction of a consumer who has had some prior exposure to a brand, but that exposure is 
sufficiently limited such that his or her memory may be hazy or imperfect. For example, 
someone may have sampled and enjoyHGDEUDQGRIEHHUDWDIULHQG¶VKRXVHDQGIRUPHGWKH
view that they would like to purchase a few bottles for themselves if and when they see it for 
sale. In this scenario a consumer may try to commit the product to memory. Once they are in 
the store, they may recall that they want to purchase the beer they sampled but have relatively 
poor memory for the brand name or the packaging. They may attempt to recognize one of the 
items on the shelf as the one they intend to purchase. Under these conditions the match 
between the package on the shelf and the memory for the packaging may dominate over any 
mismatch between the names.   
                                                                                                                                                        
because with same category pairs, participants tried to ignore the packaging and concentrated 
on trying to determine whether they recognised the name.  
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Our study does not, however, purport to speak to the scenario where a consumer is very 
familiar with a brand, such that his or her recollection is much more likely to be fixed. 
Australian courts have held that where a brand is very well-known, confusion may be less 
likely because strong prior familiarity will displace the likelihood of imperfect recollection. 
Interestingly, this sort of reasoning has not found favour in other jurisdictions. Whether 
Australian courts are right to adopt this approach is precisely the sort of matter on which 
psychologists ought to have something useful to contribute. But this was not our focus and 
for this reason alone one could not conclude from our study that the Maltesers case discussed 
in the introduction was wrongly decided.   
We also did not attempt to create a high fidelity simulation of our shopping scenarios. 
These considerations might matter if the intention were to provide evidence in a particular 
case. Our purpose, however, was to test an assumption (often implicit) in Commonwealth 
countries that dissimilar brand names will protect against confusion. Unless otherwise 
specified, such an assumption must be assumed to apply in general to marketing scenarios 
and to non-marketing scenarios as well (e.g., performance in a psychology laboratory 
experiment). Our results show that this assumption does not apply in general. This means that 
it would be hazardous to rely on this assumption in deciding a particular case unless reasons 
could be articulated as to why it would apply in that case and not in our scenarios. Of course 
a newly articulated version of this assumption is possible. For example, one might argue that 
in real world shopping scenarios consumers have learned to rely on brand names because so 
much of the packaging they encounter is confusable, or that brand names have assumed 
greater importance because internet searches rely on brand names. One way of testing 
whether these alternative versions of the assumption are plausible would be to rerun 
Experiments 1A and 1B while challenging the participants in the test instructions to ignore 
the packaging and concentrate on the name. 
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Another implication of our results relates to the way that lawyers and courts approach 
survey or experimental design. It is not uncommon for surveys or experiments tendered in 
court to adopt a single design (one survey with one question design, administered to many 
participants): even though trademark law recognises both confusion that could result from 
side-by-side and from sequential presentation (assuming confusion is more likely in the latter 
scenario). With simple stimuli (e.g., words), forced choice and yes/no tasks typically produce 
very similar results when an appropriate measure of the ability to discriminate between 
studied and non-studied items is used.10  However, as our results show, with complex stimuli 
that have different levels of similarity, an observer probably selects or weights different 
aspects of the stimulus in a side-by-side comparison versus a sequential comparison.  As we 
theorised above, consumers presented with an existing and imitator brand side-by-side may 
be forced to focus on the aspects that are dissimilar ± here, the brand name. In this situation 
appropriate discriminability measures are likely to differ between the yes/no and the forced-
choice tasks. Because yes/no and forced-choice tasks have different strengths and weaknesses 
it is frequently necessary to use both kinds of tasks in attempting to understand a difficult 
problem such as the influence of similarity on recognition. 
Finally, our research design also tested for evidence of a tendency noted in the 
marketing literature to choose familiar brands over less familiar brands. We found some 
evidence of a tendency to choose familiar brands, but the pattern of results varied over name 
similarity conditions. When distractors had similar names to the existing brand (Experiment 
1A) there were small and non-significant differences between the FARs to unrelated 
distractors with familiar-looking packages/novel names and unrelated distractors with 
familiar packages/existing names. However, the same comparisons were substantially greater 
                                                 
10
 7KHRUHWLFDOO\ G¶ D PHDVXUH RI GLVFULPLQDELOLW\ IURP VLJQDO GHWHFWLRQ WKHRU\ FDOFXODWHG
from a forced-choice task equals the VTXDUHURRWRIWLPHVG¶FDOFXODWHGIURPD\HVQRWDVN
Thus there is more information when a target and distractor are simultaneously presented 
even though the recognition process is fundamentally the same. 
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when the unrelated distractors had dissimilar brand names (Experiment 1B). Specifically, 
participants made significantly more FARs to the existing names. This is a phenomenon 
based on the pre-existing familiarity of the brands because, by definition, the unrelated 
distractors were not similar to any brand that had been studied. The failure to find this same 
effect when the distractor names were similar could suggest that the participants did not 
perceive these stimuli as being unfamiliar. In other words, the participants appear to be 
activating aspects of the memorial representation of the existing brand without recognizing 
the differences in the names. This kind of confusion also occurs in the Moses illusion where 
SHRSOH UHVSRQG ³WZR´ WR WKH TXHVWLRQ ³+RZ PDQ\ DQLPDOV RI HDFK NLQG GLG 0RVHV WDNH
DERDUGWKHDUN"´ZLWKRXWUHDOL]LQJWKDWLWZDV1RDKQRW0RVHV(ULFNVRQ	0DWWVRQ
There are also models of recognition where the presentation of a similar distractor can cause 
the memory system to converge either to the long term representation of the target or to the 
long term representation of the distractor (Chappell & Humphreys, 1994). In the later case the 
participant would be highly confident that the distractor had been studied. 
  Generally, there were modest differences between groups (existing vs. novel brand 
targets at test).  The overall picture is that people do not appear to have a much better 
episodic memory for an existing familiar brand name than they do for a novel unfamiliar 
brand name.  In Experiment 1A when distractors had a similar name to a studied item, the 
probability of correctly recognizing a studied novel brand was slightly but significantly 
higher than the probability of correctly recognizing a studied existing brand.  In Experiment 
1B, there was no significant difference between these measures.  In Experiment 2, pairs with 
an existing brand as the target were better recognized than pairs with a novel brand as the 
target in the similar name brand condition, but there were no main effects and only an 
interaction between pair type and target type in the dissimilar name brand condition.  
However, to some extent the interaction in the dissimilar brand name condition and the main 
39 
 
effect in the similar name brand condition may have been driven by a bias to choose an 
existing name over a novel name.  In summary, the differences in the ability to recognize 
studied existing and novel brands appear to be small.   
   
Conclusions 
At the outset we noted that, in Commonwealth countries and beyond, courts and 
lawyers have struggled to identify the appropriate role for psychological evidence in 
trademark proceedings. Surveys and experiments directed to particular legal controversies 
and tendered as evidence are expensive and, inevitably, subject to thorough criticism that 
often leads to them being ignored or rejected. The experiments we report here represent an 
attempt to take a different approach: examining not a particular controversy but a common 
assumption made by courts about how consumers behave.   
The results reported in this paper do support some assumptions lawyers make: that 
sequential presentation of a brand is more likely to lead to confusion than presentation side-
by-side, for example. But we did not find support for the assumption that different brand 
QDPHV ZLOO UHPRYH WKH ULVN RI FRQIXVLRQ $V ZH QRWHG LQ WKH LQWURGXFWLRQ WKLV GRHVQ¶W
necessarily mean courts should be reaching different results ± there may be good policy 
reasons to allow imitation of product get up ± but it does mean that we should be thinking 
about the issue in a different way: perhaps by recognising explicitly the policies reflected in 
our construction of consumer confusion.  
Our results also suggest another important point: that attempting to test confusion 
using psychological methods is complex. Depending on the method used, we observed 
different results. This suggests that if there is a desire to make better use of psychology in 
actual legal proceedings, it would be worth exploring whether a more nuanced approach 
should be adopted: instead of big, representative, single-approach studies, multiple smaller 
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studies that elucidate responses in a range of scenarios will provide a more accurate picture of 
ZKDWLVJRLQJRQLQFRQVXPHUV¶PLQGV 
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Table 1 
Hit Rates (HRs) and False Alarm Rates (FARs) as a function of brand types of tested items 
and their relationship with studied items for participants in the existing brand FAR and novel 
brand FAR conditions of Experiment 1A.  Related distractors had similar names.  
Test List 
Condition 
Brand Type 
of Test Item 
Relationship to studied target 
Same  (HR) Related (FAR)  Unrelated (FAR) 
Existing 
Brand FAR 
Existing .91 .69 .02 
Novel .93 -- .03 
Novel Brand 
FAR 
Existing .87 -- .03 
Novel .92 .68 .04 
Note. Both groups studied both novel and existing brands, but the study items targeted at test 
were novel brands for one group and existing for the other. A related distractor was from the 
target product category and was an existing brand for a novel target from the study phase, and 
novel for an existing target.  Unrelated distractors were novel and existing brands from 
unstudied product categories.  
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Table 2 
Hit Rates (HRs) and False Alarm Rates (FARs) as a function of brand types of tested items 
and their relationship to studied items for participants in the existing brand FAR and novel 
brand FAR conditions of Experiment 1B.  Related distractors had dissimilar names.  
Test List 
Condition 
Brand Type 
of Tested Item 
Relationship to studied target 
Same (HR) Related (FAR) Unrelated (FAR) 
Existing 
Brand FAR 
Existing .93 .67 .08 
Novel .96 -- .00 
Novel Brand 
FAR 
Existing .95 -- .03 
Novel .94 .56 .00 
Note. Both groups studied both novel and existing brands, but the study items targeted at test 
were novel brands for one group and existing for the other. A related distractor was from the 
target product category and was an existing brand for a novel target from the study phase, and 
novel for an existing target.  Unrelated distractors were novel and existing brands from 
unstudied product categories.  
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Table 3 
Probability correct as a function of pair type composition and brand type of studied item for 
participants in the similar brand and dissimilar brand conditions of Experiment 2. 
Novel Brand 
Condition 
Pair Type 
Composition 
Brand Type of Studied Item in Pair 
Existing Novel 
Similar 
Novel 
Dissimilar 
Similar to 
Existing 
Brand Name 
Same 
Category 
.92 .72 -- 
Different 
Category 
.81 .77 -- 
Dissimilar to 
Existing 
Brand Name 
Same 
Category 
.90 -- .80 
Different 
Category 
 
.81 -- .86 
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Figure 1. A graphical depiction of the study and test phase compositions for the existing 
brand FAR and similar novel brand FAR conditions in Experiment 1A.  
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Figure 2. A graphical depiction of the study and test list compositions to illustrate the pair 
types employed at test in Experiment 2.  
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APPENDIX A 
Table A1 
Thirty-six product categories commonly found in supermarkets with names of corresponding 
known brands, similar brands, and dissimilar brands that were used as stimuli 
Product Category Known Brand Similar Brand Dissimilar Brand 
Baby Wipes Huggies HugMe Dryhaps 
Batteries Duracell Evacell Supaunit 
Baked Beans Heinz Heanz %HUWLH¶V 
Biscuit Snacks Shapes Squares Tasteez 
Bread Bürgen Berjin Grainie 
Butter Western Star Northern Star Five Points 
Cake Mix *UHHQ¶V (PHUDOG¶V Mix Ups 
Canned Vegetables Edgell Vegell Sideveg 
Cereal Weet-Bix Wheat-Bits Brekkioes 
Cheese Bega Bage Chesi 
Crisps 6PLWK¶V Smithies Crunchysnax 
Coffee Moccona Maccono Instacaf 
Deodorant Rexona Rexano Temptis 
Dishwashing Liquid Morning Fresh Dawn Fresh Ultra Shine 
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Energy Drink V B Up And Atem 
Flavoured Milk Breaka Brekka Qwench 
Flour White Wings Bright Wings %DNHU¶V+HOS 
Icecream Drumstick Icedrum Delicia 
Jam IXL XLI Berie 
Milk Dairy Farmers Jersey Farmers Grazers Choice 
Muesli Bars Uncle Tobys Uncle Homers Fruity Muse 
Mustard MasterFoods MasterFeast FastFlavour 
Noodles Fantastic Terrific Nixoes 
Pasta Barilla Pastilla Italiano 
Peanut Butter Kraft Kroft Smoosh 
Pet Food Optimum Optimal Agility 
Salt Saxa Maxa Seasons 
Shampoo Pantene Santene Agent 
Soft Drink Sprite Brite Zapfiz 
Soup Continental European 6OXUSµ1*R 
Sports Drink Gatorade Energade Actron 
Stain Remover Vanish Vanquish Keepoff 
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Sugar CSR CRS Sweetr 
Tea Bushells Brambells Best Brew 
Tissues Kleenex Cleanix Clearnose 
Yoghurt Yoplait Plaityo Snappo 
 
 
 
